Grandmasters of Geopolitics
🚫🛢 The Gulf’s oil wealth has an exit problem
Part one
Before the US–Iran war, roughly a fifth of the world’s oil supply passed through Hormuz. The strait handled almost as much oil as Malacca, the world’s largest oil transit chokepoint.
Daily flows fell from 21.6 million barrels in late 2025 to 4.9 million in April–June 2026. Disruption on that scale forces refineries to compete for replacement cargoes, putting pressure on fuel prices and transport costs far beyond the Gulf.
Some oil has been rerouted, while buyers have drawn on reserves and increased purchases from producers such as the US and Brazil. These measures have softened the shortage, although additional production has covered only part of the losses. Gulf producers still need a way to sell their own oil.
🚢 Where the oil can go
Tankers can avoid Malacca by sailing through other Indonesian straits. The Persian Gulf has no second sea exit, so bypassing Hormuz means getting oil to another coast overland.
A port outside Hormuz is only useful if the oil can actually reach it. Across the Gulf, the connections available to do that are very unequal.
🇸🇦🇦🇪 Saudi Arabia and the UAE have the largest working bypasses. They can send crude to Yanbu on the Red Sea and Fujairah on the Gulf of Oman. Before the war, their pipelines offered an estimated 4.7 million barrels a day of available bypass capacity. Those crude pipelines could replace only part of the much larger flow through Hormuz.
🇮🇶🇮🇷 Iraq and Iran have more limited outlets. Iraq’s route through Turkey cannot carry most of its southern production, while road shipments through Syria and Jordan carry fuel oil. Iran has used its Goreh–Jask pipeline outside Hormuz, but shipments have faced the US blockade.
🇰🇼🇧🇭 Kuwait and Bahrain lack a comparable export bypass, leaving them much more dependent on passage through Hormuz.
🇶🇦 Qatar relies on tankers for its liquefied gas exports. Extra capacity in crude pipelines cannot replace that sea route.
A working bypass gives its owner a better chance of keeping exports moving during a shutdown. For neighbours without one, protecting export income may depend on negotiating access to somebody else’s pipelines and ports.
Kuwait has already discussed export connections with both Saudi Arabia and the UAE. Building those links could reduce its dependence on Hormuz, while making the terms of access to a neighbour’s infrastructure much more consequential.
In part two: if neighbours share an escape route, who decides whose oil moves first? And how much protection can that route actually provide?
Chat | Subscribe to @geo_grandmasters
- 5.1KViews
- 42Forwards
- 63Reactions
- Copy link
Views grew: 1.7K → 5.1K